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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT USES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO STRIKE DOWN A TWO
MILLION DOLLAR PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996)
I. FACTS
In January of 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. purchased a 1990 BMW 535i
from an authorized BMW dealership in Birmingham, Alabama, for
$40,750.88.1 After driving the car for nine months, and without noticing
any flaws in its appearance, Gore took his BMW to a detail shop to make
it look "snazzier than it normally would appear." 2 During this visit, the
detailer informed Gore that his car had been partially refinished prior to
its purchase. 3
Convinced that he had been cheated, Gore brought suit against
BMW of North America (BMW), the American distributor of BMW
automobiles. 4 Gore alleged that BMW's failure to disclose the refinish-
ing constituted suppression of a material fact in violation of Alabama
state law.5
At trial, BMW acknowledged that since 1983 its national policy was
to repair damaged cars and sell them as new, without advising dealers or
purchasers of the repairs, if the cost of those repairs did not exceed three
percent of the vehicle's suggested retail price. 6 Since the cost to repair
1. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1593 (1996) [hereinafter BMW II].
At the time of the sale, Gore signed a "Retail Buyer's Order" and an "Acknowledgment of
Disclosure" in which he acknowledged that the car might have sustained damage, that he had
inspected it, and had agreed to accept it. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621
(Ala. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995) [hereinafter BMW I].
2. BMW ,646 So. 2d at 621.
3. BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. The top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of Gore's car had been
repainted. Id. at n.2. The parties presumed that the repainting was performed to repair acid rain
damage to the automobile sustained during transit between the BMW manufacturer in Germany and a
preparation center in Virginia. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 6, BMW 1 (No. 94-896) (discussing
the damage to Gore's automobile). The only flaw in the refinishing of Gore's car was a three-to
four-inch tape line that BMW's paint technicians presumably failed to remove. BMWII, 116 S. Ct. at
1593 n.2.
4. BMW , 646 So. 2d at 622. Gore also sued BMW A.G., the German manufacturer of the car.
Id. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that BMW A.G. did not have sufficient contacts
with Alabama which would compel it to defend against the action. Id.
5. BMW 1I, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Alabama's common law action for fraud was codified at
Alabama Code section 6-5-102. See id. The statute provides that suppression of a material fact which
the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. Id. at n.3. The obligation to com-
municate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances
of the case. Id.; see also BMW !, 646 So. 2d at 622 (discussing the disposition of Gore's case at trial).
Dr. Gore also alleged breach of contract and fraud, but the suppression claim was the only one to
reach the jury. BMW !! 116 S. Ct. at 1593 n.3.
6. BMW I, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. If the cost of repairing a damaged car exceeded three percent,
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Gore's car was only $601.37, or roughly one and one half percent of its
price, BMW did not disclose the repair to Gore or the Birmingham
dealer.7
Gore asserted that his refinished car was worth ten percent, or
roughly $4,000, less than an undamaged car.8 To support his claim for
punitive damages, Gore introduced evidence that BMW had sold 983
similarly refinished cars as new since 1983, without disclosing the repairs
to dealers or purchasers. 9 Using his own damage estimate of $4,000 as a
multiplier, Gore argued that a $4,000,000 punitive award would appro-
priately penalize BMW for selling these refinished cars as new. 10
The jury found BMW liable for compensatory damages of $4,000.11
In addition, the jury determined that BMW's nondisclosure policy consti-
tuted gross, oppressive, or malicious fraud, and assessed the $4,000,000
punitive award that Gore advocated.12
In a post-trial motion to set aside the award, BMW introduced evi-
dence that its nondisclosure policy was consistent with the statutory dis-
closure requirements of roughly twenty-five states. 13 Relying on these
statutes, BMW contended that its lawful conduct in these states could not
provide the basis for a punitive award.14 BMW also asserted that its
the car would be placed into company service and then sold as used. Id.; see also Brief for the
Petitioner at 5, BMW 11 (No. 94-896) (discussing the three percent cut-off). The three percent
threshold was based on the strictest statutory disclosure requirements then in existence. Brief for the
Petitioner at 5, BMW I (No. 94-896); see also Brief for Respondent at 3, BMW 11 (1996) (No. 94-896)
(disputing BMW's contention that it disclosed repairs that cost more than three percent of the
manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP)). Gore contended that even when repairs cost more
than three percent of the MSRP, BMW did not disclose the repairs. Brief for Respondent at 3, BMW H
(1996) (No. 94-896)
7. BMW!!, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
8. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief at 2, BMW H (No. 94-896) (arguing that the value of Gore's
car was reduced 10% as a result of the refinishing). The former owner of the Birmingham dealership
where Gore purchased his BMW testified that even if the car was repainted as well as feasible, a
repainted BMW is still diminished in value approximately 10%. BMW 1, 116 S. Ct. at 1593; see also
Brief for the Petitioner at 35, BMW 1 (No. 94-896) (arguing that the refinishing did not diminish the
value of Gore's car). BMW contended that the refinishing was performed so expertly that there was
no loss in value to the car. Brief for the Petitioner at 35, BMW H (No. 94-896)
9. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1593; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 8, BMW ! (No. 94-896) (stating
that Gore based his claim for punitive damages on the sale of 983 refinished BMWs). During his
closing statement, Dr. Gore's counsel stated:
They've taken advantage of nine hundred other people on those cars that were worth
more--the damage was more than three hundred dollars ... they have profited some
four million dollars on those automobiles. Four million dollars in profits that they have
made that were wrongfully taken from people ... [L]adies and gentlemen, I ask you to
return a verdict of four million dollars in this case to stop it.
Brief for the Petitioner at 8, BMW 1 (No. 94-896). The 983 cars included only those that had repairs
of at least $300. Id. at 7. Gore did not explain this $300 cut-off. Id.
10. BMW!!, 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
11. BMW I, 646 So. 2d 619, 622 (Ala. 1994).
12. Id. (citing ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993)).
13. BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1594. The most stringent of these statutes required disclosure of





nondisclosure policy had never been adjudged unlawful before Gore
filed suit. 15 The trial court denied BMW's motion, however, holding that
the award was not excessive. 16
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected BMW's claim
that the punitive award exceeded a constitutionally permissible amount.17
However, the court also found that the jury improperly computed the
award by using out-of-state sales as a multiplier.18 Rather than relying
on these sales as a basis for Gore's award, the court considered cases
from Alabama and compared them with cases in other jurisdictions
involving the sale of an automobile and the misrepresentation of its
condition. 19 The court held that $2,000,000 was a constitutionally
reasonable punitive award and ordered a remittitur in that amount.20
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to help illuminate the standards that identify constitutionally
excessive punitive awards. 21 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held
that the $2,000,000 dollar punitive award assessed against BMW was
15. Id. But see Yates v. BMW of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993) (holding that
BMW's failure to disclose paint repair constituted fraud). The Yates verdict was reached after Gore
had filed suit but before the parties went to trial. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1594 n.9. No punitive damages
were awarded in the Yates case. Id. at 1594 n.8 (citing Yates, 642 So. 2d at 938).
16. BMW 1, 646 So. 2d at 622. The trial court reviewed Gore's award under the standards set
forth in Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986). The factors set forth in Hammond
include: the culpability of the defendant's conduct; the desirability of discouraging others from similar
conduct; the impact of the conduct on the parties; and the impact of the conduct on innocent parties.
Id.
17. BMW , 646 So. 2d at 628. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Gore's award pursuant
to the standards set forth in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989), and
approved in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1990). These standards include:
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the defendant's conduct and the harm likely to
occur (as well as the harm that has actually occurred); the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct; whether the conduct was profitable to the defendant; the financial position of the
defendant; the costs of the litigation; whether criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant
for the conduct; and whether there have been other civil actions against the defendant for the conduct.
Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223-24 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala.
1987)).
The court concluded: "BMW's nondisclosure was reprehensible; the nondisclosure was profit-
able for the company; the judgment would not have a substantial impact upon BMW's financial
position;" the litigation had been expensive; no criminal sanctions had been imposed on BMW for the
same conduct; the award of no punitive damages in Yates, 642 So. 2d at 937, reflected "the inherent
uncertainty of the trial process; and the punitive award bore a reasonable relationship to the harm that
was likely to occur from BMW's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred." BMW II, 116 S.
Ct. at 1594.
18. BMW , 646 So. 2d at 628; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 8, BMW H (No. 94-896) (stating
that Gore based his claim for punitive damages on BMW's conduct outside of Alabama). Only 14 of
the 983 sales upon which Gore based his claim for punitive damages occurred in Alabama. Brief for
the Petitioner at 8, BMW 1 (No. 94-896).
19. BMW 1, 646 So. 2d at 628.
20. Id. at 629.
21. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1995) (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331,
2335 (1994)).
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grossly excessive and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Punitive damages are money damages awarded against a wrongdoer
to punish outrageous conduct and protect the public by deterring the
wrongdoer and others from similar conduct in the future. 23 These dam-
ages may be awarded to punish conduct that is outrageous due to the
wrongdoer's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others. 24
At common law, the decision to award punitive damages and the
determination of the amount rest entirely within the discretion of the
trier of fact, whether judge or jury. 25 This "common law method" for
assessing punitive awards is not regulated by the safeguards found in
criminal proceedings, even though the goals of punishment and
deterrence for a punitive award are the same for a criminal fine. 26 In the
absence of these safeguards, punitive awards operate as private fines
levied by juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
repetition. 27 The wide discretion that juries enjoy in making these
"quasi-criminal" awards ensures that they will always be controversial.28
Punitive awards have survived this controversy largely because of
their deep historical roots.29 The modem concept of punitive awards was
first articulated in England in 1763, and subsequently introduced in the
United States twenty-one years later.30 By 1851, the United States
Supreme Court had confirmed that jury awards of punitive damages
were a well established principle of the common law. 31
22. Id. at 1604. The majority consisted of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and
Breyer. Id. at 1592. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Rehnquist dissented. Id.
23. RESTATEmENT (SEcoNi)) OF TORTS § 908 (1977); see also Hearn v. General Elec. Co., 927 F.
Supp. 1486, 1500 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that punitive awards may be imposed to further a state's
interests in punishment and deterrence).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1977).
25. Id. at § 908 cmt. d; see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (stating
that exemplary damages have always been left to the discretion of the jury).
26. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (finding no justification for allowing
awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined
standards of liability for defamation).
28. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong Medicine
or Poison Pill?, 39 U. VILL. L. REV. 353, 365-66 (1994).
29. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. Owen, supra note 28, at 368-69.
31. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851); see also Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893) (allowing a jury to award exemplary damages by way of punishing
the offender and as a warning to others); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (declaring that
nothing is better settled than the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount of the verdict);
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (stating that the wisdom of allowing
exemplary damages is attested by the long continuance of the practice); Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492 (1875) (accepting the doctrine of exemplary damages as the rule in England
and in most states).
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These historical roots proved deep enough to withstand due process
challenges to punitive awards that came with the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.32 In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway
Co. v. Beckwith,33 the Court proclaimed that punitive or exemplary
damages could not be assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth
Amendment given their repeated recognition by judicial decisions for
more than a century. 34
In the early 1900s, the Court hinted at the possibility of a due
process challenge to punitive awards by holding that statutory penalties
may deprive property without due process of law. 35 In Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher,36 the Court held that a statutory
penalty of $6,300 was sufficiently arbitrary and oppressive to violate due
process.37 The Court's holdings in this area were narrow, however, and
the states retained a wide latitude of discretion to enact penalties. 38 This
discretion enabled the common law method for assessing punitive awards
to continue to operate with the approval it had received by the Court in
Beckwith.39
Beginning in the 1970s, however, members of the Court began to
criticize the common law method on the ground that it invited
discriminatory and otherwise illegitimate awards.40 In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,4 1 the Court asserted that a jury's discretion over the amount
it may award was typically limited only by the gentle rule that the award
not be excessive. 42 Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in
wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no relation to actual harm.43
The Court's concern over punitive awards increased with the advent
of new legal tools such as bad-faith contract actions, mass torts, and
product liability suits.44 As the frequency of very large punitive awards
32. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17.
33. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
34. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26,36 (1889).
35. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 (1913) (stating that the imposition of a
fine that is grossly out of proportion with actual damages and is arbitrary and oppressive may violate
the Due Process Clause).
36. 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
37. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482,491 (1915).
38. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); see also Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (stating that the Court may only interfere when fines are
grossly excessive).
39. Beckwith, 129 U.S. at 36.
40. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declaring that punitive damages are
frequently based upon the caprice and prejudice of jurors); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that punitive damages are awarded with no
discernible limits and unlimited discretion allows juries to penalize the unorthodox or unpopular view).
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
43. Id.
44. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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increased, the Court was asked to set aside certain awards as inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause. 45 In response to these pleas and the
widespread perception that punitive damages were "skyrocketing," the
Court granted certiorari on several occasions to reexamine the common
law method of assessing punitive awards and whether it may produce
results that violate due process. 46
The Court began this reexamination in Browning-Ferris Industries
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.47 by upholding a punitive award
against an Excessive Fines Clause challenge.48 Kelco Disposal Inc.
(Kelco) brought an action in federal district court charging
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. (BFI) with antitrust viola-
tions and interference with Kelco's contractual relations in violation of
Vermont tort law. 49 A jury found BFI liable on both counts and award-
ed Kelco $51,146 in compensatory damages as well as a $6,000,000
punitive award.S0
Although the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to
awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties, it explicitly
recognized that due process imposes some limits on jury awards.5 1 The
Court stated that an award may not be upheld if it was the product of
bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings lacking the basic
elements of fundamental fairness. 52 Furthermore, precedents indicated
to the Court that the Due Process Clause imposes outer limits on the size
of a civil award made pursuant to a statutory scheme.53
However, the Court did not consider whether due process acts as a
check on punitive awards in the absence of a statutory limit.5 4 The Court
45. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. NEGOrIATION L. REV. 4,
79 (1996).
46. Owen, supra note 28, at 401; see also Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that jury discretion in making punitive awards under
Mississippi law may violate the Due Process Clause); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
828-29 (1986) (stating that the appellant's due process challenge to a punitive award raised important
issues which must be resolved).
47. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
48. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989).
49. Id. at 261.
50. Id. at 262.
5 1. Id. at 276. The Court did not go so far as to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies only
to criminal cases. Id. at 263. Thus, it left the door open for an Eighth Amendment challenge to a puni-
tive award whose proceeds go to the state. Id. at 264; see also Owen, supra note 28, at 401 (stating
that the Court in Browning did not reach the issue of punitive awards whose proceeds go to the state).
As legislatures increasingly enact reform statutes requiring payment of a portion of punitive damage
awards to the state, the excessive fines issue may become increasingly important. Owen, supra note
28, at 401.
52. Browning, 492 U.S. at 276.
53. Id. (citing St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)).
54. Id. at 277.
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also declined to directly review Kelco's award for excessiveness, leaving
that inquiry to state law.
5 5
In a significant concurrence, Justice O'Connor recommended that
courts should accord substantial deference to legislative judgments con-
cerning appropriate sanctions in determining whether a punitive award is
unreasonable. 56 While this recommendation was directed towards a
review under the Excessive Fines Clause, it would become an important
part of the Court's due process analysis. 57
In 1990, the Court squarely addressed whether a punitive award
could violate the Due Process Clause in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip.58 Haslip filed an action for fraud in Alabama state court
alleging that an agent for Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. (Pacific) misap-
propriated insurance premiums.5 9 A jury returned a verdict of over
$1,000,000 against Pacific, at least $840,000 of which came in the form
of a punitive award. 60
While the Court upheld the award against Pacific's due process
challenge, it explicitly recognized that unlimited jury or judicial discre-
tion in fixing a punitive award may invite extreme results that "jar one's
constitutional sensibilities." 61 Thus, the traditional common law method
for assessing punitive awards, while not per se unconstitutional, could
produce results that violate due process. 62
The Court could not draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable punitive
55. Id. at 280. In a concurrence, Justice Brennan asserted that the Court's decision left the door
open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains punitive damages in civil cases between
private parties. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan reasoned that this constraint is
vital given the unlimited discretion that juries have in making this important and potentially devastating
decision. Id. at 281. Justice O'Connor also asserted that nothing in the Court's opinion foreclosed a
due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they are imposed. Id. at
283 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor felt the award to Kelco, which was 117 times
actual damages and which far exceeded the highest punitive award by a Vermont court, exemplified
the fact that punitive damages were skyrocketing. Id. at 282.
56. Id. at 301.
57. Id.; see also BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1603 (1996) (citing legislative judgments as to the
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue as one of the guideposts in determining the
reasonableness of Gore's punitive award).
58. 499 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
59. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990). The Court concluded that the
agent for Pacific was acting as an employee when he defrauded Haslip, and that imposing liability
upon Pacific for their agent's fraud did not violate Pacific's due process rights. Id. at 15.
60. Id. at 7. The Court estimated that the punitive award was at least $840,000 in light of Haslip's
prayer for compensatory damages of $200,000. Id. at 7 n.2.
61. Id. at 18-19. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that only a verdict returned by a
biased or prejudiced jury violates due process, and the extreme amount of an award compared to the
actual damage inflicted can be some evidence of this bias or prejudice in an appropriate case. Id. at
41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In a dissent, Justice O'Connor concluded that the common law pro-
cedures for awarding punitive damages encourage inconsistent results by inviting juries to rely on
private beliefs and personal predilections. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 17-18.
306 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:299
award that would fit every case. 63 An award that was not "reasonable,"
however, or an award made by a jury that did not receive "adequate
guidance from the court" would from now on be constitutionally
suspect. 64 The Court stated that due process will be satisfied as long as
jury discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints.65
Although the Court refused to set aside the award as inconsistent
with due process, it clearly left open the possibility that a punitive award
may be unacceptable in an extreme case. 66 In so doing, the Court
refused to adopt Justice Scalia's view that the Constitution imposes no
constraints on a jury's punitive damages award. 67
Three years later, however, the Court all but adopted this view in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.68 Alliance Resources
Corp. (Alliance) brought an action against TXO Production Corp.
(TXO) in West Virginia state court for slander of title. 69 A jury awarded
Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages, as well as a $10,000,000
punitive award. 70 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that this
monstrous award did not violate the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. 71
The plurality explicitly recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes a substantive limit on the amount of a punitive damages
award. 72 However, it refused to establish a test to determine what that
63. Id. at 18. The award was more than four times the amount of compensatory damages and
more than 200 times Haslip's out of pocket expenses. Id. at 23. The Court stated that these ratios
were "close to the line" of constitutional impropriety. Id. at 24. The Court also noted that, while the
award was far in excess of the fine that could have been imposed on Pacific for insurance fraud,
imprisonment could have been imposed on an individual in the criminal context. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 20. Significantly, the Court explicitly approved Alabama's common law procedures for
assessing and reviewing punitive awards only six years prior to BMW. Id. at 22. The Court approved
the constraints contained in the instructions given to Alabama juries, stating that these standards impose
sufficiently definite and meaningful constraints on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding
punitive damages. Id. The Court also approved the Hammond factors that Alabama trial courts use to
review awards. Id. at 20-22 (citing Hammond v. Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986)).
Finally, the Court approved the Green Oil factors that the Supreme Court of Alabama uses to conduct
its review. Id. (citing Green Oil Co. v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222-23 (Ala. 1989)). The Court
stated that the Alabama Supreme Court's post verdict review ensures that punitive damages awards
are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have some understandable
relationship to compensatory damages. Id.; see also BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (1996) (noting that
the Alabama Supreme Court had used the Green Oil factors in determining whether Gore's award
was excessive).
66. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
67. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 79; see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that the traditional practice of American courts, which leaves punitive awards to the discretion
of the jury, should not be disturbed).
68. 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993) (plurality).
69. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 447 (1993) (plurality). Alli-
ance's slander of title action was actually a counterclaim. Id. TXO filed the original action to quiet
title on an interest in oil and gas development rights they had purchased from Alliance. Id.
70. Id. at 451.
71. Id. at 462.
72. Id. at 455.
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limit might be, instead reviewing the award pursuant to the general
concerns of reasonableness that the Court espoused in Haslip.73
Although the award was over 526 times the actual damages that
TXO allegedly caused, the plurality considered the potential harm that
TXO's conduct would have caused to Alliance if its wrongful plan had
succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have
resulted if TXO's behavior were not deterred. 74 The Court stated that
the disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award was not
controlling given the large amount of money at stake; TXO's bad faith;
the fact that TXO's scheme was "part of a larger pattern of fraud,
trickery and deceit;" and TXO's wealth. 75
Although the plurality in TXO continued to claim that the Constitu-
tion imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive awards, its deci-
sion seemed to indicate that this limit would never be reached. 76 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia declared a de facto victory for his view,
claiming that due process challenges to punitive awards could henceforth
be disposed of because the award would be "no worse than [that in]
TXO."77 One year later, however, the Court would use a seemingly
trivial Oregon case to underscore once again the potential dangers of un-
checked punitive damage verdicts and the availability of the Due Process
Clause to remedy arbitrary awards. 78
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,79 the Court held that' a 1910 amend-
ment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibited judicial review of a puni-
tive award violated the Due Process Clause.SO In striking down the
73. Id. at 458.
74. Id. at 462. TXO contended that evidence of its alleged wrongdoing in other parts of the coun-
try biased the jury. Id. at 462 n.28. However, the Court stated that use of such conduct was well
settled and typically considered a factor in assessing punitive awards. Id.
75. Id. at 462. The plurality conceded that requiring jurors to take the wealth of a defendant into
account in determining an award could increase the risk of prejudice against large, out-of-state
corporations. Id. at 464. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy reiterated his belief that judicial review
of punitive awards should focus on awards that reflect bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the
jury. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that an award that is the product of bias or prejudice violates
the constitution). In another concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that while judicial assessment of the
reasonableness of a punitive award is a federal right, a correct assessment of the reasonableness of an
award is not. TXO, 509 U.S. at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring).
In a dissent, Justice O'Connor asserted that jury awards in similar cases, as well as civil and
criminal penalties created by the legislature, can give the Court some idea of the reasonableness of a
punitive award. Id. at 483 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In this case, the award was over 500 times
actual damages, 10 times larger than the largest punitive award for the same tort in any jurisdiction,
and 20 times larger than the highest punitive award ever upheld in West Virginia history. Id. at
481-82. In a case involving a mere business dispute and no grave physical injury, Justice O'Connor
asserted that proportions such as these surely must raise a "suspicious judicial eyebrow." Id.
76. Owen, supra note 28, at 402.
77. TXO, 509 U.S. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. Owen, supra note 28, at 405 (citing Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994)).
79. 114S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
80. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (1994). The amendment prohibited review
of the amount of punitive damages awarded unless the court could say affirmatively that there was no
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amendment, a majority of the Court explicitly recognized that due pro-
cess imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damage awards.8 1
The Court categorically stated that "[p]unitive damages pose an
acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property." 82 The Court attrib-
uted this danger to jury instructions that typically allow wide discretion
in choosing the amount of an award.8 3 The Court also explicitly
recognized that evidence of the defendant's wealth creates the potential
that juries will use verdicts to express biases against big businesses,
particularly those without a strong local presence.8 4
The Oberg decision was significant for its recognition that courts
have a responsibility under the Due Process Clause to remedy improper
and arbitrary awards.8 5 However, neither Oberg, nor any prior decision
by the Court provided any constitutional rules for the assessment of
punitive awards. 86 Moreover, none of these decisions resulted in the
invalidation of a punitive award because it was too large.8 7 As a result,
there was little to indicate that the Court was prepared to take the unprec-
edented step of finding that the punitive award in BMW violated the Due
Process Clause.
III. ANALYSIS
Writing for the majority in BMW, Justice Stevens began by deter-
mining whether the Alabama jury properly considered BMW's out-of-
state conduct in assessing its punitive award, and whether punishment of
this conduct furthered Alabama's interests in punishment and deter-
rence.88 Justice Stevens stated that, while Alabama and other states may
protect citizens by requiring automobile distributors to disclose presale
evidence to support the verdict. Id. In the original case, Oberg brought a product liability action for
injuries sustained on an all-terrain vehicle manufactured by Honda Motor Co. (Honda). Id. A jury
found Honda liable and awarded Oberg $900,000 in compensatory damages as well as a $5,000,000
punitive award. Id.
81. Id. at 2335.
82. Id. at 2340.
83. Id. at 2340-41.
84. Id. In a dissent, Justice Ginsburg asserted that Oregon's pre-verdict measures regulating
punitive awards channeled jury discretion more tightly than those reviewed in either Haslip or TXO.
Id. at 2344-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1990)
and TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)). Oregon law permitted
plaintiffs to recover no more than the amounts specified in their complaint. Id. at 2344 (citing OR. R.
Crv. P. 18B (1994)). Plaintiffs could not introduce evidence regarding a defendant's wealth until a
prima facie claim for punitive damages was made out. Id. (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 41.315(2) (1991)).
Plaintiffs also had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the "defendant show[ed] wanton
disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others." Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1991)).
85. Owen, supra note 28, at 405.
86. Id. at 401.
87. See Sunstein, supra note 45, at 79 (stating that prior to BMW 1I the Court refused to set aside
a punitive award as inconsistent with due process).
88. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595-98 (1996). Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in
which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Id. at 1592.
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repairs that affect the value of a car, no single state could impose this
policy choice upon another state.8 9 Each state's power to impose
burdens such as these on the interstate market is constrained by the need
to respect the autonomy of other states, as well as the federal commerce
power. 90
In light of this principle, the Court held that a state may not impose
economic sanctions on violators of its own laws with the intent to change
a tortfeasor's lawful conduct in other states.9 1 These economic sanc-
tions, whether in the form of legislatively authorized fines or judicially
imposed punitive damages, must be supported by the State's interest in
protecting its own consumers and its own economy. 92
Based on these factors, the Alabama Supreme Court properly ruled
that the jury award impermissibly punished BMW for lawful extraterrito-
rial conduct that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. 93 With the
inquiry limited to conduct that occurred in Alabama, however, the Court
found that the $2,000,000 award approved by the Alabama court was
grossly excessive in relation to Alabama's interests in punishment and
deterrence. 94
The Court reviewed the remitted award in terms of a form of
"substantive due process." 95 The Court cited "elementary notions of
fairness" which dictate that persons receive fair notice not only of the
89. Id. at 1596-97. The Court noted that some states may conclude that disclosure requirements
are unnecessary, while others that require disclosure may exempt minor repairs in order to provide a
"safe harbor" for the automobile industry against lawsuits over those repairs. Id. at 1596. This
diversity demonstrated to the Court that reasonable people may disagree about the value of a full
disclosure requirement. Id.
90. Id. at 1597 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1989) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-96 (1824)); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 20, BMW II (No. 94-896)
(arguing that the punitive award assessed by the Alabama jury impermissibly punished BMW for
out-of-state conduct). BMW contended that Gore, as a private attorney general, has no authority to
infringe the sovereignty of Alabama's sister states. Brief for the Petitioner at 20, BMW IH (No.
94-896).
91. BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1597. The Court stated that it need not consider whether one state may
properly attempt to change a tortfeasor's unlawful conduct in another state. Id. at 1598 n.20; see also
Brief for the Petitioner at 19, BMW ! (No. 94-896) (arguing that the conduct for which BMW was
punished was lawful where it occurred). BMW adduced evidence that 60% of the sales for which it
was punished took place in states with disclosure thresholds equal to or higher than that adopted by
BMW. Brief for the Petitioner at 19, BMW ! (No. 94-896). Virtually all of the remaining sales took
place in states that had not adopted requirements but had never held a similar nondisclosure to be
improper. Id.; see also Brief for the Respondent at 11-12, BMW ! (No. 94-896) (arguing that it was
necessary to punish BMW's out-of-state conduct). Gore argued that BMW would not discontinue its
disclosure policy if it were punished only for its conduct in Alabama. Brief for the Respondent at
11-12, BMW ! (No. 94-896).
92. BMW!1, 116S. Ct. at 1597.
93. Id. at 1598. Although the Alabama jury impermissibly used out-of-state sales as a multiplier
in computing the amount of the punitive award, the Court noted that evidence of a defendant's out of
state conduct is relevant to the determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct. Id. at 1598 n.21 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
462 n.28 (1993)).
94. Id.
95. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 80.
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conduct that will subject them to punishment, but also of the severity of a
penalty that a state may impose.96 Three guideposts indicated to the
Court that BMW did not receive notice of the huge award that Alabama
imposed: the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the dis-
parity between the harm or potential harm suffered by Gore and his
punitive damages award (ratio); and the difference between this remedy
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 97
A. DEGREE OF REPREHENSIBILITY
Reflecting the principle that some wrongs are more blameworthy
than others, the Court stated that the degree of reprehensibility of the
wrongdoer's behavior is perhaps the most important indicia of the
reasonableness of a punitive award.98 In TXO, for example, this concept
was the key to the Court's holding that TXO's pattern of conduct ex-
hibiting "trickery and deceit" warranted a substantial punitive award.99
In this case, however, the Court found none of the aggravating
factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct.100 The harm
BMW inflicted on Gore was purely economic in nature; the presale
refinishing of Gore's car had no impact on its performance or safety;
and BMW's conduct evinced no indifference to or reckless disregard for
the health and safety of others.01
Gore argued that BMW's out of state conduct was particularly
reprehensible because its nondisclosure policy constituted a nationwide
pattern of tortious conduct.102 Gore reasoned that BMW should have
anticipated that its nondisclosure policy would expose it to liability
because state disclosure statutes supplement, rather than supplant, exist-
ing remedies for common law fraud.103
The Court conceded that evidence showing that a defendant has
repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct, while knowing or suspecting
that it was unlawful, would provide strong support for a large punitive
award.104 However, the Court considered two factors that indicated that
96. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
97. Id. at 1598-99.
98. Id. at 1599 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851)); see also Owen, supra note 28, at
387 (stating that the flagrancy of the misconduct is thought to be the primary consideration in
determining the amount of punitive damages).
99. BMW I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1599 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 462 (1993)); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that defendant's
malice was the deciding factor in a close case).
100. BMW!1, 116 S. Ct. at 1599.
101. Id. The Court cautioned that infliction of economic injury can warrant a substantial penalty
where the harm is done intentionally or through affirmative acts of misconduct, or when the target is
financially vulnerable. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brief for the Respondent at 4-5, 18, BMW 1 (No. 94-896).
104. BMW!1, 116 S. Ct. at 1599.
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BMW had not shown this type of disrespect for the law. 105 First, in the
absence of a state court determination to the contrary, BMW reasonably
interpreted the various disclosure requirements as establishing "safe
harbors" for automobile companies against liability for nondisclosure
of presumptively minor repairs.106 Second, there was no evidence that
BMW acted in bad faith when it relied on state disclosure statutes to
establish a three percent cutoff between presumptively minor damage
and damage that warranted disclosure.107
The Court also found no evidence that BMW persisted in a course
of conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful on even one occasion.108
Unlike the defendants in TXO and Haslip, BMW made no deliberate false
statements, nor any acts of affirmative misconduct or concealment of
improper motive. 109 In light of these facts, the Court found BMW's non-
disclosure less reprehensible than a deliberate false statement, particul-
arly considering BMW's good faith basis for believing that no duty to
disclose existed.11O While BMW's conduct was wrongful, the Court
noted that conduct that gives rise to tort liability does not necessarily es-
tablish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive
award. I l
B. RATIO
"The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an
excessive or unreasonable punitive award is its ratio to the actual or
potential harm inflicted on the plaintiff."1 2 While there is a long-held
notion that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
compensatory damages, the decisions in Haslip and TXO provided
evidence to the Court that this comparison is still significant.113 In
Haslip, a punitive damages award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages was considered "close to the line" of constitu-
tional impropriety. 114 In TXO, the decision to uphold a $10,000,000
dollar award was based on the reasonable relationship between the award
105. Id. at 1600.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1600-01.
108. Id. at 1601. Before the verdict in this case, BMW changed its nondisclosure policy with re-
spect to Alabama. Id. at 1601 n.31. Five days after the jury award, BMW altered its nationwide
policy to one of full disclosure. Id.
109. Id. at 1601 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) and TXO Prod.




113. Id. (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 and TXO, 509 U.S. at 459).
114. Id. at 1602 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
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and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that has occurred.ll5
The $2,000,000 punitive award to Gore was 500 times the amount
of his actual damages."l 6 In the absence of any evidence that Gore or
any other BMW purchaser was threatened with any additional potential
harm, the Court found this ratio grossly excessive. 117
The Court once again rejected the notion that reasonableness is
marked by a mathematical formula.' 18 Cases in which particularly
egregious conduct nets only minor damages could certainly support a
higher ratio between punitive and compensatory awards, as could cases
in which the injury is hard to detect or value.119
The Court also stressed that the ratio will be within an acceptable
range in most cases and a remittitur will rarely be justified on this
basis.120 However, the Court agreed with Justice O'Connor's observation
in TXO that an award with a ratio of 500 to 1 must surely raise a
"suspicious judicial eyebrow."121
C. SANCTIONS FOR COMPARABLE MISCONDUCT
The Court also adopted Justice O'Connor's recommendation in
Browning that a reviewing court should "accord 'substantial deference'
to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the con-
duct at issue." 122 In this case, the maximum civil penalty authorized by
the Alabama legislature for a violation of its Deceptive Trade Practices
Act was $2,000.123 While other states authorized more severe sanctions,
the Court found no statute or judicial decision that would have provided
an out of state distributor with fair notice of a multimillion dollar
penalty. 124
115. Id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 460).
116. Id. Even assuming that the repainting reduced the value of each BMW by $4,000, the
award was 35 times greater than the total damages of all 14 Alabama residents who purchased
repainted BMW's. Id. at 1602 n.35.
117. Id. at 1602.
118. Id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 458).
119. Id.; see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 459-60 (illustrating the concept that a large award may be
supported by only minor actual damages).
For instance, a man wildly fires a gun into a crowd. By sheer chance, no one is injured
and the only damage is to a $10 pair of glasses. A jury could reasonably find only $10 in
compensatory damages, but thousands of dollars in punitive damages to teach a duty of
care.
TXO, 509 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 902 (W. Va.
1991)).
120. BMWII, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
121. Id. (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
122. Id. at 1603 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).




Nor could the two million dollar sanction be justified on the ground
that it was necessary to deter future misconduct. 125 In the absence of
any history of noncompliance, the Court held that Alabama should have
considered whether less drastic means were available to motivate BMW's
compliance with Alabama's disclosure requirements.126
Significantly, the Court concluded by declaring that BMW's status
as a large, wealthy corporation rather than an impecunious individual did
not diminish its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that states can
impose on the conduct of its business. 127 The Court stated that BMW's
active participation in the national economy implicated the federal
interest in preventing individual states from imposing undue burdens on
interstate commerce. 128 The Court reversed and remanded the judgment
of the Alabama Supreme Court.129 The Court left the decision as to the
appropriate remedy for the excessive award to the state court in the first
instance. 130
1. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
While the majority focused on the substantive component of the
Due- Process Clause, Justice Breyer's concurrence was procedurally
oriented. 131 Justice Breyer criticized the standards that Alabama used to
constrain a jury's discretion in making a punitive award.132 While these
standards need not be precise, Justice Breyer warned that they invite
close scrutiny when they are vague enough to risk arbitrary results.133
Justice Breyer's inquiry focused on the standards contained in
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby134 and used by the Alabama Supreme Court to
review punitive awards. 135 Although the Court approved these standards
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1604.
128. Id.
129. BMW!!, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
130. Id. On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a new trial was warranted unless
Gore accepted a remittitur of damages to the sum of $50,000. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
No. 1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *9 (Ala. May 9, 1997).
131. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 80. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer's
concurrence. BMW!!, 116 S. Ct. at 1592.
132. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. Id. Justice Breyer noted that the Alabama statute that allowed punitive damages for fraud
could not constrain jury discretion because it permitted punitive damages for relatively minor conduct
and did not distinguish between conduct warranting very small and conduct warranting very large
awards. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 6-11-20)(a) (1993)). Justice Breyer stated that the statute defined
"oppression, fraud, wantonness or malice" broadly enough to include conduct that was not very
serious. Id. at 1605-06.
134. 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
135. BMW II, 116 U.S. at 1606 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala.
1989)).
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in Haslip, Justice Breyer found that they imposed little constraint on the
jury's discretion in determining Gore's award. 136
Green Oil requires that a punitive award should "bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's
conduct as well as to the harm that actually has occurred." 137 In Gore's
case, the Supreme Court of Alabama found a reasonable relationship
between a $2,000,000 award and the harm caused by BMW even though
the record indicated that only thirteen other incidents of nondisclosure
had occurred in Alabama. 138 Using Gore's actual damage estimates,
Justice Breyer reasoned that the Supreme Court of Alabama should have
found that BMW caused $56,000 in economic harm if it truly "eschewed
reliance" on BMW's out-of-state conduct.139
Second, Green Oil requires consideration of the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant's conduct. 140 Justice Breyer found that this
factor was rendered meaningless, given the lack of evidence that BMW's
conduct was especially or unusually reprehensible enough to warrant a
$2,000,000 penalty. 14 1
Third, Green Oil requires punitive awards "to 'remove the profit'
of the illegal activity and be in excess of the profit, so that the defendant
recognizes a loss."142 Justice Breyer asserted that this factor's ability to
constrain jury discretion was not utilized, since the Supreme Court of
Alabama did not limit the award to an amount near the $56,000 in
"profits" that BMW allegedly received. 143
Fourth, Green Oil requires courts to take the financial position of
the defendant into account.144 While Justice Breyer conceded that a
larger award may be necessary to punish a wealthy defendant, he main-
tained that this factor provided an open-ended basis for inflating an
award when the defendant is wealthy.145 Although the consideration of a
defendant's wealth is not unlawful or inappropriate, Justice Breyer
concluded that this factor certainly did not constrain the jury's
discretion.146
136. Id. at 1607 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1990)).
137. Id. at 1606 (citing Green Oil Co., 539 So. 2d at 223).
138. Id. (citing BMW 1, 646 So. 2d 619, 627-28. (Ala. 1994)); see also Brief for the Petitioner at
9, BMW 1I (No. 94-896) (arguing that the $2,000,000 award bore no reasonable relation to BMW's
conduct inside Alabama). BMW argued that the jury's choice of a $4,000 per car punishment strongly
suggests that it would have chosen $56,000 as the appropriate punishment for BMW's
Alabama-related conduct. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, BMW 11 (No. 94-896).
139. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1606.
140. Id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223).
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223).
145. Id. at 1606-07.
146. Id. at 1607.
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Fifth, Green Oil requires courts to take into account "the 'costs of
the litigation' and the State's desire 'to encourage plaintiffs to bring
wrongdoers to trial.'"147 While this factor could have constrained the
jury if the award was linked to the actual costs of Gore's litigation,
Justice Breyer contended that it could not constrain an award which was
excessive for other reasons. 148 Furthermore, by encouraging plaintiffs to
bring wrongdoers to trial, this factor could enhance a jury's discretion-
ary power, especially if unsupported by a special need to encourage
litigation. 149
While these factors might theoretically act as constraints on arbitrary
behavior, Justice Breyer asserted that they did not constrain the Alabama
court system in this case.1 50 Given this lack of constraint and the fact
that the award was grossly excessive in light of Alabama's legitimate
punitive damages objectives, Justice Breyer concluded that the "strong
presumption of the validity of the award" was overcome.151
2. Justice Scalia's dissent
Justice Scalia reiterated his position that the Due Process Clause
does not contain a federal guarantee that a punitive award actually be rea-
sonable. 152 Justice Scalia conceded that Haslip and TXO advanced the
possibility that the measure of civil punishment may pose a due process
question for the Court. 153 Neither decision, however, nor any of the
precedents upon which they relied, actually took the step of declaring an
award unconstitutional simply because it was "too big."
154
Justice Scalia also argued that the three guideposts set forth by the
majority provided no guidance to legislatures, or state and federal courts,
as to what a constitutionally proper level of punitive damages might
be.155  As to the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
147. Id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223). The last two Green Oil factors require courts to
take into account any criminal sanctions or civil actions against the defendant for the same conduct.
Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223-24. Justice Breyer could not discern any other standard enunciated by
the Alabama courts or legislature, nor any community or historical practice which might have
constrained the jury. BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1607-08.
151. BMWII, 16 S. Ct. at 1609.
152. Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. Jus-
tice Scalia believed that the Court erred in its claim that Alabama had no power to punish BMW's
conduct that was lawful where it occurred. Id. at 1612. While a person may not be held liable and be
punished on the basis of a lawful act, the degree of his or her punishment may be increased on the
basis of any conduct that displays wickedness, unlawful or not. Id. Justice Scalia also concluded that
the Supreme Court of Alabama had already resolved the extraterritoriality issue. Id. at 1613.
153. Id. at 1611 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)
and Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)).
154. Id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 462, and Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19).
155. Id. at 1612. Justice Scalia felt that the majority left a loophole in the guideposts, enabling
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the majority offered only that nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence and that trickery and deceit are more repre-
hensible than negligence.156 As to the proper ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, the majority offered only that a general concern
of reasonableness enters into the constitutional calculus.157 As to the
final guidepost, legislative sanctions for comparable misconduct, the
majority offered only that they should be accorded substantial
deference.158 In short, Justice Scalia felt that the guideposts provided
only an artificial air of doctrinal analysis for an ad hoc determination
that Gore's award was not fair. 159
3. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
Justice Ginsburg warned that this decision took the court into
territory traditionally within the domain of the states. 160 Justice Gins-
burg found this venture especially inappropriate in light of the reform
measures recently adopted or currently under consideration in legislative
arenas. 161 To emphasize this point, Justice Ginsburg pointed to reforms
recently enacted or currently under consideration in the states, including
caps on punitive awards, allocation of punitive damages to state agencies,
and mandatory bifurcated trials with separate punitive damage
determinations. 162
Justice Ginsburg found the majority's venture into state territory
particularly unwise in light of the vague concept of substantive due
process that it used as its guide.163 While Justice Breyer's procedural
them to be overridden if "necessary to deter tortious conduct." Id. at 1613 (citing BMW II, 116 S. Ct.
at 1603-04).
156. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-93 (1983)).
157. Id. at 1613-14 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 458).
158. Id. at 1614 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301
(1989)).
159. Id. Considering the ease with which the Court ignored the jury's determination of how
reprehensible BMW's conduct was, Justice Scalia reasoned that it could have also ignored their
determination that BMW was reprehensible at all. Id. Justice Scalia warned that the logical
consequence of this approach would be a constitutional right against unreasonably imposed awards, as
well. Id.
160. Id. at 1616-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Ginsburg's
dissent. Id. at 1614. Justice Ginsburg also asserted that no impermissible extraterritoriality infected
the judgment before the Court. Id. at 1615. Since Alabama's highest court had already declared that
the jury could not use the number of similar acts that a defendant had committed in other jurisdictions
as a multiplier, Justice Ginsburg found it unlikely that this problem would occur again. Id.
Furthermore, in TXO the Court had characterized the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's
alleged wrongdoing in other parts of the country as well settled. Id. (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 n.28).
Justice Ginsburg found the decision especially harsh since the Alabama court applied standards that
the Supreme Court had approved in Haslip. Id. at 1616 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22). Accordingly,
Justice Ginsburg felt that the judgment of Alabama's highest court was entitled to a presumption of
legitimacy. Id.
161. Id. at 1617-18.
162. Id. at 1618-20.
163. Id. at 1617.
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approach was more engaging, Justice Ginsburg found that its ultimate
conclusion would be the same as that of the majority: "too big" will be
judged unfair.164 Under either approach, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that "too big" would merely be the amount at which five members of
the Court bridle.165
IV. IMPACT
The BMW decision had an immediate impact at the federal level. In
Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 166 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a $30,000,000 punitive award
violated due process in light of the decision in BMW.167 Continental
Trend Resources, Inc. (Continental) filed suit against Oxy U.S.A., Inc.
(Oxy), alleging that Oxy tortiously interfered with Continental's existing
and prospective contracts under Oklahoma law.168 A jury awarded
Continental $269,000 in compensatory damages as well as the punitive
award.169
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit originally upheld the
punitive award as consistent with due process. 170 The Supreme Court va-
cated the judgment, however, and remanded the case in light of the deci-
sion in BMW. 171 On remand, the court of appeals held that $6,000,000
was the maximum constitutionally permissible award justified by the
facts of the case. 172
The court of appeals applied the three BMW guideposts to deter-
mine that the award violated due process.173 While the court concluded
that Oxy's behavior was sufficiently reprehensible to support a substan-
tial penalty, the harm inflicted was entirely economic in nature "and
thus less worthy of punishment than harm to health or safety."1 74 The
court also concluded that the ratio between the award and the actual and
potential harm to the plaintiffs was too large.175 Finally, although similar
164. Id. at 1617 n.5.
165. Id.
166. 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996).
167. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 642 (10th Cir. 1996).
168. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 44 F.3d 1465, 1471 (10th Cir. 1995).
169. Id. at 1471-72.
170. Id. at 1480.
171. Oxy U.S.A., Inc. v. Continental Trend Resources, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996) (mem.).
172. Continental, 101 F.3d at 643.
173. Id. at 636-43.
174. Id. at 642.
175. Id. The court noted that the BMW decision referred to the language in Haslip which stated
that an award with a ratio of more than four times the compensatory award was "close to the line" of
constitutional impropriety. Id. at 639 (citing BMW I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1602 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991))). The BMW decision also referred to TXO, where the harm
likely to result from the defendant's conduct brought the ratio down to "no more than ten to one." Id.
(citing BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1602 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 460 (1993))). Based on this language, the court of appeals surmised that in economic injury cases
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cases from other states provided notice to Oxy of the potential for large
punitive awards, the court found that $30,000,000 was far more than
necessary to modify Oxy's behavior in Oklahoma. 176
While BMW dealt with constitutional limits to punitive awards, fed-
eral courts are also using the BMW guideposts to determine merely
whether punitive awards are "excessive." 177 In Patterson v. PHP Health-
care Corp.,178 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
relied on BMW to strike down a $150,000 punitive award.179 As this
decision suggests, federal courts will use the BMW guideposts to review
awards that are paltry when compared to the award in BMW.180 The
guideposts will be a very powerful tool in limiting the size of punitive
awards when used in this context. 181
While BMW will be used to limit awards at the federal level, it may
prove easily distinguishable in state courts. In Mehlman v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,182 for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey was able to
distinguish BMW in upholding a punitive award of $3,500,000.183
where the damages are significant and the injury not hard to detect, the ratio of punitive damages to
harm generally cannot exceed ten to one. Id.
176. Id. at 641-42. The court noted that Oxy's misconduct involved a violation of common law
tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison with statutory penalties. Id. at 641. In this
situation, the court determined that "sanctions for comparable misconduct" could be determined by
whether a tortfeasor had reasonable notice that its behavior could result in a large punitive award. Id.
177. See Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that,
although BMW dealt with constitutional limits on punitive damages, the decision is instructive in
determining the reasonableness of a punitive award); see also Schimizzi v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.,
928 F. Supp. 760, 783-86 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that a $600,000 punitive damages award was
excessive under the guideposts set down in BMW). Although BMW II dealt with the Due Process
Clause, the district court noted that BMW H also examined whether an award was "grossly
excessive." Schimizzi, 928 F. Supp. at 785; see also BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd., 90 F.3d 1318
(8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the effects of BMW I1 factors on the determination of the reasonableness
of a punitive award). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that it will also utilize the BMW 11
guideposts, predicting that a $20,000,000 award where the plaintiff's compensatory damages were
$125,000 would have been excessive in light of the factors in BMW 11. BE & K Constr. Co., 90 F.3d at
1330 n.15.
178. 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
179. Patterson, 90 F.3d at 943. The plaintiff, a mental health technician, brought a racial discrim-
ination claim against PHP Healthcare Corp. (PHP) under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 930. The district
court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $22,648 in lost income and benefits, $40,000 in
emotional damages, along with the punitive award. Id. at 932. The court of appeals found that PHP's
conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible, since Brown was not personally subjected to verbal or
physical abuse. Id. at 943. The court also found that Brown's award bore no reasonable relationship
to his compensatory damages, in light of earlier rulings reducing his back pay and emotional harm
damages. Id. Furthermore, even if it left the back pay award at $22,648, the court indicated that the
punitive award might still be excessive, in light of its six and a half to one ratio to Brown's actual
damages. Id. Finally, the court compared the award in this case with comparable cases and found
that the largest punitive award assessed under § 1981 in the Fifth Circuit was $50,000. Id.
180. Id. at 943 (citing BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-99).
181. See id
182. 676 A.2d 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
183. Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 676 A.2d 1143, 1165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); see also
Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801, 816-17 (S.D. 1996) (upholding a punitive award
of $750,000 despite the presence of only $25,000 in compensatory damages). A jury awarded the
damages for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the sale of investments. Schaffer, 552 N.W.2d at
804. The South Dakota court found the decision in BMW ii distinguishable on three grounds. First,
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Mehlman brought suit against Mobil Oil Corp. (Mobil) under the
Conscientious Employee Protection Act claiming that he was discharged
in retaliation for his objection to dangerous levels of benzene in Mobil
gasoline.' 8 4 A jury returned a verdict in Mehlman's favor and awarded
him $3,440,300 in compensatory damages in addition to the punitive
award.185
The court in Mehiman asserted that this was not the type of punitive
damages situation brought into question in BMW.186 Rather, the court
based its decision on TXO and the potential harm that Mobil's conduct
could have produced.187 The court found that a large award was neces-
sary to deter Mobil and companies like it from silencing their
employees.188
Despite this distinguishability, BMW may seriously undermine state
policies regarding the punitive awards process. 189 The decision appears
to ignore concerns of federalism by legitimizing substantive due process
review as a means of challenging state regulations regarding punitive
awards.190 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, this new constitutional
review of punitive awards is especially unwelcome in light of state efforts
to handle the problems associated with punitive damages.191
Constitutional review of punitive damages could also mean that an
award that complies with a state statutory maximum may still violate
substantive due process. 192 Such a holding would be in direct contradic-
tion with a state legislature's mandate that a punitive award that complies
with its guidelines is not excessive. 193
This scenario is unlikely to occur in North Dakota, however, due to
the state's highly detailed regulation of punitive awards. 194 In North
while the failure to disclose predelivery repairs to automobiles in BMW H was not treated with
uniformity by the states, the South Dakota court noted that no state would condone fraud. Id. at 813
n.16 (citing BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1594). Second, BMW H was distinguishable in light of the absence
of false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of improper motive in that case.
Id. at 816-17 (citing BMW I, 116 S. Ct. at 1601). Finally, the court noted that BMW II addressed
whether a state may punish a defendant for conduct that was lawful where it occurred. Id. at 811
n.12. But see Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 636-37 (10th Cir.
1996) (interpreting BMW I to prohibit the assessment of punitive damages for the purpose of
inhibiting unlawful conduct in other states as well as lawful conduct).
184. Mehlman, 676 A.2d at 1146.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1165.
187. Id. (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456-58 (1993)).
188. Id.
189. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term Leading Cases, 110 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 135, 152
(1996) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
190. Id. (citing BMW 1, 116 S. Ct. at 1598).
191. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1617-18 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 154.
193. Id.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1996); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (Supp. 1996)
(providing for the regulation of punitive damages awards). The Minnesota Legislature has enacted
somewhat less detailed regulations than its North Dakota counterpart. These regulations include a
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Dakota, punitive damages are only available if the defendant has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence to have acted with oppression,
fraud, or actual malice. 195  Furthermore, the amount of an exemplary
award in North Dakota may not exceed two times the amount of com-
pensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater.196
Unfortunately, BMW provides little guidance to either state courts or
legislatures regarding the contours of the constitutional limitations on
excessive punitive awards. 197 This lack of guidance is heightened by the
sharp division within the Court. 198 Although the five-member majority
in BMW spoke in terms of "substantive due process," three members, or
a majority within the majority, joined a concurring opinion that was
procedurally oriented. 199 Furthermore, four Justices still appear con-
vinced that the Constitution imposes no substantive limits on the size of
punitive awards.200
Finally, the BMW Court's criticism of wealth as a factor in determin-
ing the amount of a punitive award may prompt a change in various state
and federal punitive damages regulations. 201 The Court's refusal to
recognize the continued validity of the wealth factor in BMW, coupled
with its earlier criticism of the use of this factor in Oberg, indicate that
requirement that plaintiffs show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant deliberately
disregarded the rights or safety of others, detailed factors by which trial and appellate courts must
determine and review a punitive award, and bifurcation of the proceedings at the request of either
party. MINN. STAT. AN. § 549.20; see also 1995 MINN. HousE FILEs, 184 (SN) (proposing additional
regulation of punitive awards). The Minnesota Legislature recently defeated a bill that would have
required a reasonable relationship between punitive awards and compensatory damages. 1995 MINN.
HOUSE FnLEs, 184 (SN).
195. N.D. CEir. CODE § 32-03.2-11(1) (1996). North Dakota also allows the proceedings to be
bifurcated at the request of either party, and evidence of the defendant's financial condition or net
worth is not admissible in the proceeding on exemplary damages. Id. at § 32-03.2-11(2), 11(3).
196. Id. § 32-03.2-11(4). These "capped" awards are also reviewed for reasonableness. Id. §
32- 03.2-11(5). Factors to be considered are: whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
exemplary damages claimed and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that has actually occurred; the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the
duration of the conduct; the defendant's awareness of any concealment of the conduct; the
profitability to the defendant of the conduct and the desirability of removing the profit and having the
defendant sustain a loss; and criminal sanctions against the defendant for the same conduct. Id.
197. Leading Cases,supra note 189, at 145; see also BMW II, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1612 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the decision provides no guidance as to what the constitutionally
proper level of punitive damages might be); Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc.,
101 F.3d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing the difficulty of arriving at a precise dollar figure for a
punitive award when applying guidelines that contain no absolutes).
198. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 80.
199. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1592. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer's con-
currence. Id.
200. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 80. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent and Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent. BMW 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1592.
201. BMW II, 116 S. Ct. at 1604; see Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 659 (8th Cir. 1995)
(using the wealth of the defendant to determine the reasonableness of a punitive award); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (Supp. 1996) (requiring the wealth of the defendant to be taken into
account to determine a punitive award).
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the defendant's wealth may soon be an impermissible factor in assessing
a punitive award. 202
V. CONCLUSION
With BMW, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time
that a grossly excessive punitive award violates the Due Process Clause.
In so doing, the Court was willing to step into an area that was already
teeming with legislative activity. The question now becomes whether the
Court intended to supersede this activity and establish a new "federal law
of damages," or whether it merely tired of the Alabama punitive
damages "lottery" and the notoriously large awards that it produced.
Michael Thomas Andrews
202. See BMW H, 116 S. Ct. at 1604; Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340-41
(1994). But see Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641-42 (stating
that the BMW 11 decision did not mean that the wealth of the defendant is irrelevant to the
determination of a punitive award). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that wealth must
remain relevant, because $50,000 may be awesome punishment for an impecunious individual
defendant but wholly insufficient to influence the behavior of a prosperous corporation. Id. at 641.
Furthermore, a rich defendant may force or prolong litigation because it can afford to do so and a
plaintiff may not be able to bear the costs and the delay. Id. at 642. The court stated that nothing in
the BMW I1 decision would appear to prohibit consideration of the cost of legal proceedings in
determining the constitutionally permissible limits on punitive awards. Id.
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